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This paper elucidates the common law doctrine of stare decisis and the meth-
odology of using precedents, including the practice of distinguishing and 
overruling them.1 
 As noted in Cross and Harris’s classic book Precedent in English Law, “It 
is a basic principle of the administration of justice that like cases should 
be decided alike.”2 In the common law system, this principle takes on the 
form of a positive obligation: previous decisions must be followed unless 
there is a justification for departing from them. This is the essence of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
 After sketching the development of the doctrine of stare decisis and ex-
plaining what is meant by ratio decidendi, distinguishing, and overruling, 
this paper will reveal a profound insight into precedents, namely, that 
they are employed basically like statutes, but statutes which have a trans-
parent “legislative” history or travaux préparatoires. Then the paper will 
show that precedents play a significant role in civil law jurisdictions like 
Germany. Finally, the paper will enumerate the jurisprudential justifica-
tions which underpin the doctrine of precedent.  
 
1. See generally Thomas Lundmark, Charting the Divide between Common and Civil Law 
ch 9 (2012); Thomas Lundmark, “Umgang mit dem Präjudizienrecht,” Juristische 
Schulung 546 (2000); Thomas Lundmark, Juristische Technik und Methodik des Com-
mon Law (1998). 
2. Rupert Cross & JW Harris, Precedent in English Law 3 (4th ed 1991). 
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1. The historical development of the modern doctrine of 
stare decisis 
How did stare decisis come to take on such an important role in the com-
mon law system? Originally, during the initial development of the com-
mon law in England when there were very few statutes, the idea took 
hold that earlier decisions could provide assistance in deciding new cases. 
This phenomenon is seen most clearly in Henry de Bracton’s De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae (The Laws and Customs of England), published 
in the mid-13th century. Bracton systematized all of English law into a ra-
tional system in this seminal work. And the law that he systematized con-
sisted of judicial pronouncements alongside statute law. Bracton makes 
no distinction between them relative to sources of law and stature: judi-
cial pronouncements are simply accorded equal status with statutes. This 
view of the law was not just Bracton’s: it reflected the understanding of 
law in the early centuries of the common law that judicial pronounce-
ments were merely statements of what the judges believed the law to be 
at the time. They were not understood to constitute acts of a sovereign 
who wished to change existing law. The common law was already in ex-
istence, waiting to be discovered by the king’s judges. 
 Even though judicial pronouncements were merely statements of what 
the judges believed the law to be, they were entitled to great respect. As 
reported in the previous paragraph, Bracton’s work tacitly assumes that 
the pronouncements of the judges have a status equal in authority to that 
of the statutory pronouncements of the sovereign. Unsurprisingly, then, 
De Legibus led directly to the publication of the Year Books (1268-1535).  
 The Year Books were made possible by the practice of English lawyers 
and law students of recording certain aspects of important judicial deci-
sions that they had observed in judicial proceedings. These observers 
would briefly report the relevant facts of the dispute and the arguments 
of counsel, including counsel’s citations to statutes and previous deci-
sions, that is, precedents. These lawyers and students would, of course, 
also summarize the ruling and the reasoning of the common law judge or 
judges as announced orally from the bench. As stated above, the rulings 
themselves consisted of pronouncements of what the judges believed the 
law to be, whether the law was statute law or common law in the sense of 
law as found or proclaimed by the judges in the absence of statute. The 
reasoning that was reported in the Year Books consisted of the judges’ ap-
plication of the law to the facts of the case before them. Consequently,  
THE METHODOLOGY OF USING PRECEDENTS 
 337
readers of the Year Books would find the pronouncements of what the 
judges took to be the binding statutory or common law on the subject at 
hand as well as the reasons why the judges felt that the binding law dic-
tated that they decide the case in the way that it was decided.  
 Nowadays, many people would say that the common law judges were 
being ingenuous, or even that they were being dishonest. Consider the 
following. In cases where there was an applicable statute, the judges 
would discuss the statute in light of their own precedents, if any, that in-
terpreted the statute. In other words, the judges treated their own prec-
edents as being equal in status to statutory law. If there were no statutes, 
the judges would simply treat their own precedents as having the same 
force as statutory law. And whether the judges were applying a statute 
interpreted by precedent or a precedent based on the common law, they 
were often in a position to alter (“distinguish” or “overrule”, discussed 
below) that precedent at will. This was the case if the precedent had been 
issued from the judges’ own court or from a court inferior to their own 
court. 
 To summarize, the Year Books reported only the facts of the dispute, the 
arguments of counsel (including precedents and statutes cited), the pro-
nouncements of the judges as to the applicable law, and the ruling of the 
judges along with their reasoning, all of which were briefly recorded in 
writing from oral statements made in court. Interestingly, what were not 
included in the Year Books were the actual judgments of the court. Indeed, 
it was not until 1765, with Plowden’s Reports, that court judgments were 
recorded regularly and reliably. The year 1865 saw the publication of the 
Law Reports by the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting, a commission 
which had been set up specifically for this purpose, and which still exists 
today. It will be seen that the availability and reliability of these law re-
ports were crucial to the development of the doctrine of precedent as we 
know it today.3  
 Everywhere in the common law world today, judges sitting on lower 
courts will follow the published decisions of appellate courts in their own 
judicial hierarchy on questions regarding the interpretation of statute law 
and of the common law. This is due to what can be referred to as custom 
or convention. There are virtually no statutes which require this practice, 
 
3. John H Baker, The Common Law Tradition: Lawyers, Books and the Law ch 14 (2000). 
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which is referred to as vertical stare decisis.4 This custom or convention 
serves the obvious public purpose of equality: like cases will be decided 
alike. In addition to serving equality, the custom or convention of vertical 
stare decisis promotes predictability in the law: once the appellate judges 
have ruled on a particular issue, people in that jurisdiction can be quite 
sure that inferior judges will rule the same way. In addition, this practice 
promotes judicial efficiency: when confronted with a legal issue that has 
already been decided by a higher court in their hierarchy, the inferior 
judges do not need to reexamine the ruling; they can simply adopt the rul-
ing as their own. This saves the parties from having to appeal, and saves 
the appellate judges from having to reiterate their previous ruling. 
 From the above exposition, it would appear that vertical stare decisis 
has been practiced in England at least since the mid-13th century. This is 
not the case, for the horizontal form of stare decisis, that is, the convention 
of higher courts, such as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and 
the Supreme Court of the United States, to abide by their own precedents. 
The horizontal form of stare decisis first began to establish itself in the 
common law world, specifically in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, some six centuries after the establishment of the vertical form. 
This also holds true for the modern practice of finding the law in individ-
ual cases. 
 To understand why the horizontal form of stare decisis, and the modern 
practice of finding the law in individual cases, came to be established so 
late, at least relative to the vertical form, one must examine the historical 
record to identify the forces at play. The first relevant development was 
the enactment of the Judicature Acts in 1876.5 Before these enactments, the 
British courts were not organized according to a clearly structured hier-
archy. For example, the judgments of the common law courts might be 
appealed within the common law judicial system, or they might be chal-
lenged in the equity courts, which did not adhere to the customary prac-
tice of following the decisions of the higher courts in the common law sys-
tem, for they had their own court system. Second, before the 19th century, 
court decisions were not reliably reported and published to the general 
 
4. One notable exception to this is Article 141 of the Constitution of India, which 
states that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts 
within the territory of India. 
5. Jim Evans, “Changes in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century,” 
Precedent in Law 58 (Laurence Goldstein ed 1991). 
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legal public.6 Without ready access to the decisions of the higher courts, it 
was practically impossible for judges and lawyers alike to find the rel-
evant portion of the judgment, that is, its ratio decidendi, discussed below. 
Without knowing the ratio, it is not possible to employ judicial decisions 
in lieu of statutes. 
 The third, and arguably the most important, of these historical forces 
was constitutional in character: the reconsideration of the role of common 
law, that is, judge-made law, in light of the developing democratization 
and concomitant increased respect for separation of powers. From the 
earliest years of the common law, it was thought that the common law 
was not to be found in individual court decisions; rather the case deci-
sions in their totality were a reflection of what the law was.7 Law other 
than statute law was understood to exist independently, as if woven in to 
the fabric of society or perhaps even transcendent. This understanding 
served as a convenient fiction to avoid confrontation with the monarchy. 
Statute law was made by the sovereign, either directly by edict from the 
king or queen, or through the royal organ of the Parliament. Common 
law, in contrast, was not made: it was merely discovered. According to 
this understanding, which we might today call a fiction, judges were not 
acting in a political or legislative way; they were acting like conscientious 
civil servants doing the heavy lifting for the monarchy. This view of the 
role of judges and of precedents persisted literally for centuries. In fact, it 
was only from the beginning of the 19th century that some appellate courts 
began to speak about the binding power of individual legal decisions. 
Law was not to be found in the totality of precedents, but rather in indi-
vidual precedents.8 As explained in the following paragraph, this deve-
lopment suggests that the judges had elevated themselves from the role 
of law-finders to law-makers, or at least had begun to acknowledge that 
this was the case. This radically new view of the role of precedents quick-
ly spread throughout the common law world, with the result that the 
birth of the modern doctrine of stare decisis – that the applicable law is to 
be found in the rules (usually called ratios or holdings) announced in in-
dividual cases – can be dated to the middle of the 19th century.9 
 
6. Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making 221 et seq. (7th ed 1964).  
7. AKR Kiralfy, Potter’s Historical Introduction to English Law and its Institutions 275 (4th 
ed 1958). 
8. Max Radin, Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History 356 (1936). 
9. JD Murphy & R Rueter, Stare Decisis in Commonwealth Appellate Courts 3 (1981). 
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 One of the most significant drivers behind this modern view of the doc-
trine of stare decisis was the work of John Austin (1790-1859), one of the 
pioneers of legal positivism in the common law world. Austin contra-
dicted the then widely held view that law was transcendent, capable of 
being found, but not created. He disseminated the positivist notion that 
law “properly so called” consisted only of the norms that originate from 
the deliberate pen of the legislator or other “law giver.”10 The logical 
consequence of this notion was that, assuming a particular law was rec-
ognized to be a binding legal rule, to the extent that Parliament had not 
made that law, such as was the case for the common law, then the judges 
must be making it. According to this line of thinking, common law judges 
were necessarily “law givers”. But, according to the doctrine of separation 
of powers, popularized by John Locke (1632–1704) and Montesquieu 
(1689-1755), having judges as legislators would contravene the doctrine of 
separation of powers by intruding on the province of the democratically 
constituted Parliament. Without meaning to minimize the positivistic in-
fluence of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), 
who raised the same objections to common law, it was primarily due to 
Austin’s assault that judicial pronouncements would be widely seen, 
pretty much for the first time, as intruding improperly upon the legisla-
tive prerogative.11  
 Thus chastised by Hobbes, Bentham, and finally Austin, the legal 
establishment began to look at the legal system as follows: First, judges 
must decide the cases presented to them, and they must decide according 
to law, even if the law which they use to decide the case is the common 
law, that is, judge-made law. In such cases, the judges are compelled to 
pronounce what the common law is on the subject. Because this pronounce-
ment has the character of law, the judges are, admittedly, acting as “law 
givers”. This is necessary, but it is also regrettable because it would have 
been more democratically legitimate if Parliament had pronounced what 
the law should be on the subject. Second, while it is admittedly necessary 
for judges to pronounce what the law is when the legal issue is presented 
for the first time, and there is no applicable statute, it is decidedly not 
necessary for the judges to change their pronouncement the next time a 
similar case reaches their court. Indeed, it would be best for the judges to 
stand by their previous decision and wait for Parliament to affirm it or re-
 
10. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 268 (1832). 
11. See EC Clark, Practical Jurisprudence: A Comment on Austin 4 et seq. (1883). 
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ject it by explicit legislation. If Parliament did not reject the pronounce-
ment, that would be seen as an affirmation. By deferring to Parliament in 
this way, judges believed that they were not only protecting equality and 
predictability in the law, not to mention acting efficiently,12 but that they 
were also showing respect for democracy and separation of powers.  
 This positivist approach led the British judiciary to adopt a strict under-
standing of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis. At the end of the 19th 
century, the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or “Law Lords”, the most senior 
judges in the United Kingdom at the time, declared in London Street 
Tramways v London County Council that they regarded themselves to be 
bound by their own earlier judgments on the law (at least those involving 
the interpretation of statutes) until Parliament acted to change those 
judgments.13 This ruling remained in force for over half a century. It was 
not until 1966 that the Law Lords in a Practice Statement announced that 
they would in future depart from the approach announced in London 
Street Tramways. However, they would depart from previous precedents 
only when they felt that failure to do so would lead to injustice or would 
obstruct the development of the law.14 In announcing this momentous 
change of direction, the Law Lords specifically acknowledged two uni-
versally recognized justifications for overruling precedents: mistake and 
changes in society. These are discussed in the following section.  
 In contrast to the House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted Kingdom), the Court of Appeal of England and Wales still considers 
itself to be bound by its own previous decisions, subject to a number of 
exceptions. Yet it recognizes that the Supreme Court of the United King-
dom may overrule these decisions by pronouncing a new rule.15  
 In the United States, in line with the venerable judicial practice in 
common law jurisdictions, both federal and state courts adhere to the doc-
trine of vertical stare decisis. However, American courts, unlike the British 
Law Lords, have never voluntarily relinquished their prerogative to de-
 
12. These are the three jurisprudential justifications for the vertical form of stare decisis. 
13. London Street Tramways v London County Council, 1898 AC 375. 
14. Zenon Bankowski, D Neil MacCormick, & Geoffrey Marshall, “Precedent in the 
United Kingdom,” Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 326 (MacCormick & 
Summers eds 1997). 
15. Zenon Bankowski, D Neil MacCormick, & Geoffrey Marshall, “Precedent in the 
United Kingdom,” Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 326 (MacCormick & 
Summers eds 1997). 
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part from their own previous decisions. They continued to shape and 
mould their jurisprudence as they saw fit, without waiting for the federal 
Congress or the state legislatures to intervene. 
 Departures from previous decisions (“overruling”) are the subject of 
the following section. “Distinguishing” is explained in section C. 
2. The overruling of precedents 
When do courts depart from their previous decisions, and when should 
they? To answer these questions, Lewis A Kornhauser employs the model 
of an immortal judge.16 In this imaginary court system, which consists of a 
single judge, the training, experience, and fundamental personal values of 
the immortal judge will influence to some degree how the judge sees the 
cases, the judge’s selection of the applicable statutes, the judge’s selection 
of the applicable case decisions, and the judge’s solutions. Provided the 
immortal judge has perfect recall of all of her previous decisions, similar 
cases will be decided alike to a degree unattainable by any group of 
judges, no matter how well trained. For the individuals in the group will 
differ in their training, experience, fundamental personal values, etc. The 
quality of the decision-making in such a legal system would ensure an 
extremely high degree of equality, legal predictability, and trust in the ju-
diciary (legitimacy).  
 According to Kornhauser, faced with a case with facts similar to one of 
her precedents, the immortal judge will only depart from a precedent (in 
other words, she would only overrule one) in three situations: first, if she 
now realizes that she made a mistake in the previous case; second, if im-
portant social, legal, or other features of society have changed since she 
announced the previous decision; or third, if her fundamental personal 
values have changed. We know that normal, mortal judges make mis-
takes now and then, even those sitting in the Supreme Court of the Uni-
ted Kingdom, as they have acknowledged this in their 1966 Practice State-
ment, where they recognized their ability and responsibility to correct 
their previous per incuriam (“through lack of care”) decisions. Where the 
social situation, perceptions of public policy, or developments in the law 
have changed since the previous ruling, even the Justices of the United 
 
16. Lewis A Kornhauser, “Modeling Collegial Courts, II,” Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organization 441 et seq. (1992). 
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Kingdom Supreme Court will occasionally change their minds; and, in 
doing so, we will expect them to describe what has changed and to justify 
the resultant, changed legal consequences. A dynamic understanding of 
the stare decisis doctrine therefore makes exceptions to the horizontal ef-
fect of precedents in the interests of correcting errors (corrective over-
rulings) and of updating case decisions to comport with modern situati-
ons (renovative overrulings). 
 What of the third situation identified by Kornhauser in which the im-
mortal judge might amend her previous rulings: changes in the judge’s 
personal fundamental values? In reality, neither immortal nor mortal 
judges are likely to change their personal fundamental values. In the real 
world, an overruling which can only be explained by a change in the per-
sonal fundamental values of the judges is one that is due to a change in 
the composition of the court. This type of overruling is described here as 
being legislative or political. As witnessed in the London Street Tramways 
case, and as reiterated in the 1966 Practice Statement, it is this type of rul-
ing – here termed legislative or political overruling – which the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom believes must be avoided for fear of tread-
ing on Parliament’s toes. Recalling that the vertical form of stare decisis 
serves three jurisprudential purposes – equality, legal predictability, and 
efficiency – it is submitted that the horizontal form has a fourth purpose: 
respect for separation of powers. This purpose encourages judges not to 
upset the decisions of their predecessors on the court simply because they 
would have decided the case differently if they had been on the court at 
the time the case was decided.  
 Two leading American political scientists, Saul Brenner and Harold 
Spaeth, published a study in 1995 in which they examined the overruling 
practice of the United States Supreme Court over a number of years, 
including 1953 through 1969, the years in which Earl Warren was Chief 
Justice. The Warren Court, as it is known, was widely seen then and now 
as an activist court which, among other things, expanded the rights of 
those who stood accused of crimes in the federal and in the state courts.17 
This required the overruling of a good number of precedents that had 
shown great deference to the legislatures and judges of the states. Brenner 
and Spaeth shared the view that the United States Supreme Court was ac-
tivist in the years that they researched, as the provocative title of their 
 
17. See generally Frederick P Lewis, The Context of Judicial Activism: The Endurance of the 
Warren Court Legacy in a Conservative Age (1999). 
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book makes clear: Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme 
Court 1946-1992. Over this span of years, Brenner and Spaeth identified 
11518 decisions in which the United States Supreme Court overruled one 
or more of its precedents.19 According to the research of the author of this 
paper, in the period from 1966 to 2010 the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, or its predecessor the Law Lords, overruled 12 previous deci-
sions.20 While these years were not known as years of judicial activism in 
the United Kingdom, it should be remembered that the Law Lords had 
been refusing to overrule their previous decisions since the London Street 
Tramways decision in 1898.  
 In order to compare the overruling practices of these two courts, one 
must also know that the United States Supreme Court issued 6,553 full 
decisions during the years 1946 to 1992,21 whereas the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom and the Law Lords issued only 1,315 during the years 
1966 to 2010. Further, there was a significant disparity in the number of 
judges who sat on the two courts during these periods of time: only 29 on 
the United States Supreme Court, and 62 on the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom. Mindful of these divergences, and of the fact that the 
periods of time studied do not coincide, it is nonetheless tempting to 
compare the relative rates of overruling by the two courts. Doing so re-
veals that the United States Supreme Court overruled at a rate of 1.13 per 
cent while the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom overruled at a rate 
of 0.61 per cent. 
 These facts and figures, although crude, suggest that the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom is approximately twice as deferential to 
precedents as the United States Supreme Court. This on its own is inter-
 
18. Saul Brenner & Harold D Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Su-
preme Court 1946-1992 at 22 (1995). 
19. Forty-one of Brenner and Spaeth’s 115 overruling cases overruled solely cases de-
cided before 1946. Subtracting these 41 cases from the 115 overruling reduces the 
number of overruling cases by the United States Supreme Court to 74 during the 
period from 1946 to 1992. There were five more cases that overruled cases both be-
fore and after 1946. All of the remaining 74 overrulings only involve cases decided 
after 1945. See Saul Brenner & Harold D Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of 
Precedent on the Supreme Court 1946-1992 appendix I (1995). 
20. Four of these were decided before 1966, reducing the number of overruled deci-
sions to eight. 
21. Epstein, Segal, Spaeth, & Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, 
and Developments 212 (2nd ed 1996). 
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esting. But perhaps the justices of the United States Supreme Court made 
more mistakes than their British brethren and therefore had to correct their 
jurisprudence more often (corrective overruling). Or it might be the case 
that the American justices had more of a need to update their jurispru-
dence to comport with modern situations (renovative overrulings). As 
explained above, these two types of overruling – corrective and reno-
vative – are consistent with separation of powers and respect for the legis-
lative branch of government. 
 The only type of overruling which is arguably22 disrespectful of separa-
tion of powers is legislative or political overruling. Consequently, rather 
than looking at the gross percentages of overrulings in general, it would 
be more revealing for our purposes to assess and compare the rates of po-
litical overrulings. If one disregards the non-political overrulings (i.e., the 
corrective and renovative ones) and just calculates the rate of political 
overruling, one finds that the United States Supreme Court engages in 
political overruling at a rate of 0.47 per cent, which is six times more often 
that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (0.08 per cent). Thus, em-
ploying this measure, one can generalize by saying that the United States 
Supreme Court is far more likely than the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom to overrule politically. 
 But this imbalance might be traceable to a fundamental difference 
between the roles of the two courts. The United States Supreme Court, 
unlike the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, has the power to 
declare acts of the President and of the Congress of the United States, and 
the governors and legislatures of the states, to be unconstitutional under 
the United States Constitution. The only direct way for these organs of 
government to “correct” such a declaration is to amend the United States 
Constitution, which is an extremely difficult task.23 In the United King-
dom, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom does 
not hold this power, so that Parliament retains the power to “correct” rul-
ings of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by a simple act of Par-
liament. This means that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 
unlike their brethren on the United Kingdom Court, have an obligation to 
 
22. Here a distinction must be made between judicial interpretation of statutes and ju-
dicial interpretation of a constitution. The former may be “corrected” by the legisla-
ture; the latter not. Consequently, judges should arguably be more willing to over-
rule decisions interpreting the constitution. 
23. Thomas Lundmark, Power & Rights in US Constitutional Law 70-92 (2nd ed 2008). 
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revisit previous decisions to the extent that they are based on United Sta-
tes Constitutional law. 
 If one considers these constitutional factors, bears in mind that the ra-
tes of overruling and the numbers of overruling cases are small, and 
remembers that the classification between political versus non-political 
overrulings is inexact, it would be misleading to generalize further than 
to conclude on the basis of this study alone that the overruling practice of 
the two courts is similar. 
3.  Finding the ratio decidendi, using the ratio like a statutory 
norm, and distinguishing 
Having addressed the historical and jurisprudential framework for follow-
ing precedents, we will now consider how precedent is actually used. In 
order to apply a previous decision, the first task is to find a decided case 
with basically similar facts (a process of equivalence). This process in-
volves the same mental process as looking for relevant statutes. In fact, 
many if not most precedents are the result of statutory interpretation.  
 Once a case with similar facts has been found, it is necessary to identify 
the rule – the ratio decidendi – of the case that has been found. This need 
to identify the ratio of the case holds both for cases that interpret and 
apply statutes (i.e., statutory rules) and for cases that interpret and apply 
propositions (i.e., judge-made rules) of the common law (i.e., law in the 
absence of a statute). In cases that interpret and apply statutes, the ratios 
announced by the court represent, in effect, concretizations of how the 
statute is to be applied in the particular circumstances of the case. Similar-
ly, in cases that interpret and apply propositions of common law (i.e., 
common law rules), just as with cases that interpret and apply statutes 
(i.e., statutory rules), the ratios announced by the court represent, in effect, 
concretizations of how the common law rule is to be applied in the particu-
lar circumstances of the case. 
 The ratio is sometimes referred to as the holding or the rule of the case, 
and represents that aspect of the case which may be binding precedent. In 
almost all cases, the ratio has been stated in the form of a rule by one or 
more of the judges who decided the precedent. Ordinarily, that rule can 
be found as a headnote at the beginning of the published report of the case. 
It is almost never necessary to extract or induce the ratio from the case. 
Indeed, in author’s many years of practicing law in which he dealt with 
THE METHODOLOGY OF USING PRECEDENTS 
 347
hundreds of cases, he cannot remember a single instance in which it was 
necessary to induce the ratio. 
 Up to this point, the only function of the facts of the case has been as a 
mean to help to locate the statutory or common law rule that appears to 
provide the solution to the case at hand. This even holds true for the ex-
tremely few cases in which the ratio must be extracted or induced from 
the case. To state the obvious: one must first find the case before one can 
induce a ratio from it. 
3.1. The textual approach to using the ratio 
Once identified, how is a ratio decidendi used? Simply said, it is used like a 
statutory rule. The most common approach is to apply the ratio according 
to its wording, just as one would apply a statute in a textual manner. This 
approach or “method” is also known as the linguistic method or the plain 
meaning rule of statutory interpretation. At its core, the textual approach 
asks, “What does the rule say?” As such, this approach is fundamentally 
concerned with the wording of the ratio in question and aims to establish 
the meaning of the individual words or of the sentence as a whole. In so 
doing, it aims to ascertain what the ratio is actually stating, rather than 
what the judge or judges who articulated the ratio actually intended to 
say. (This is the subject of the historical interpretation, discussed in the 
follow section.) It should be noted that this method of interpretation is not 
restricted to legal rules; it is frequently used in all subjects in the human-
ities to determine the meaning of textual passages.24 Perhaps as a conse-
quence of the general acceptance of the validity of this approach, some 
people are of the view that this method of interpretation should take prec-
edence over the others.25 In the author’s experience as a practicing lawyer, 
the vast majority of uses of ratios employ the textual approach. 
3.2. The historical approach to using the ratio 
The historical approach to statutory interpretation is sometimes termed 
“subjective interpretation” because it asks, “What did the people who 
drafted the rule mean?” A more pointed way to put the question is, “How 
would these people decide the case at hand?” This approach aims to iden-
tify what the members of the legislature intended to say, rather than what 
 
24. Norbert Horn, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie paragraph 
176 (5th ed 2011). 
25. Bernd Rüthers & Dirk Fischer, Rechtstheorie paragraph 731 (5th ed 2010). 
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they actually did say, which is the aim of linguistic interpretation.26 In or-
der to follow the train of thought of the members of the legislature, the in-
terpreting judge or lawyer will consult the legislative history or travaux 
préparatoires. This might include statements by proponents of the legisla-
tion and the minutes of committee meetings and the like. This approach is 
always problematic. For one thing, it is often difficult to find documenta-
tion. This is especially true for older legislation. For another, social and 
economic conditions may have changed since the statute was enacted. 
Other problems arise because of the length of the legislative process and 
the inability to assess whether, for example, a statement of intent as stated 
in the report of a committee was actually shared by the members of the 
legislature who voted in favour of the legislation, or even if they had 
knowledge of the content of the committee report. Because of such prob-
lems, the historical approach is often of questionable use to statutory in-
terpretation.  
 Turning to the interpretation of ratios, the situation regarding the his-
torical approach is not nearly so dire. After all, the ratio will be found in a 
judicial decision that was reached by a small number of judges who had 
access to the same materials and who heard the same oral arguments. Not 
infrequently, individual judges will add a concurring judgment to the 
judgment of the court. Consequently, it is much easier to answer the more 
pointed question above: “How would these people decide the case at 
hand?”  
 When we engage in this exercise of trying to imagine how the judges 
who decided the precedential case would decide the case at hand, it is 
important to recognize that we are employing the historical approach to 
interpretation and not, as commonly thought, applying the precedent by 
analogy. Statements such as the following, which is just one of many, are 
therefore patently mistaken:  
 “This type of reasoning in common law is called case-based reasoning, 
which is inductive in nature ... Civil law relies more on rule-based reason-
ing, which is deductive in nature.”27 
 
26. Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium paragraph 247 (3rd ed 1992). 
27. Fleure Nievelstein, Tamara van Gog, & Frans J Prins, “Learning Law: The Problems 
with Ontology and Reasoning,” Handbook of Research for Educational Communications 
and Technology 553 (David Jonassen et al eds 2008). 
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3.3. The teleological (functional) approach to using the ratio 
The teleological or functional approach to statutory interpretation derives 
its name from the ancient Greek telos, meaning “aim”. In statutory inter-
pretation, this approach seeks to determine the meaning and purpose of 
the statutory rule, the so-called ratio legis.28 This approach to statutory in-
terpretation summarizes the relevant arguments for the interpretation of 
statutes that do not fall within the ambit of the textual or historical ap-
proaches. In this respect, the term “teleological” is used in order to diffe-
rentiate this approach from the textual and historical approaches, which 
are necessarily limited respectively to textual arguments and to evidence 
from the historical record. One can summarize as follows: While the 
textual approach asks “What does the rule say?” and historical approach 
asks “What did the people who drafted the rule mean?” the teleological 
approach asks “What do we think the rule should mean?”29  
 In statutory interpretation, the regulatory purpose of the statute is to 
be determined in the abstract, that is, in isolation from any actual legal 
dispute. Nevertheless, the regulatory purpose of the statute is easier and 
more accurately determined if one also considers the conflicts of interest 
that underlie the act. For every statute is the result of a weighing up of 
opposing interests.30 In effect, every statute is a hypothetical judgment 
about which interests, and consequently which party, should prevail. Ac-
cordingly, in the context of statutory interpretation, it must be asked how 
the members of the legislature evaluated these conflicts of interest, and 
which interests were chosen to predominate.31  
 Everything said above about the teleological or functional approach to 
statutory interpretation applies with equal force to the interpretation of 
ratios. Just as with statutory rules, case-based rules can be expanded and 
restricted. As described by Kornhauser in his discussion of the doctrine of 
 
28. While Savigny named this method “systematic”, he was nevertheless referring to 
what we know today as the teleological method. Klaus Adomeit & Susanne 
Hähnchen, Rechtstheorie für Studenten paragraph 66 (5th ed 2008). 
29. Rolf Wank, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen 97 (3rd ed 2005). 
30. Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische Studium paragraph 251 (3rd ed 1992). 
31. Norbert Horn, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie paragraph 
182 (5th ed 2011). See generally Dieter Schmalz, Methodenlehre für das juristische 
Studium paragraph 252 (3rd ed 1992) and Peter Schwacke & Rolf Uhlig, Juristische 
Methodik mit Technik der Fallbearbeitung und Normsetzungslehre 37 (2nd ed 1985). 
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stare decisis in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,32 one might look 
behind the ratio for a broad legal principle. This corresponds to looking 
behind a statutory rule for a broad function or purpose, which is ordinari-
ly termed a teleological extension when speaking of statutory interpret-
ation. In the opinion of the author, this nomenclature should also be used 
when speaking of ratios. On the other hand, one might narrow the ratio to 
the fact-based result of the case. This corresponds to a teleological reduc-
tion of a statute. There is, therefore, some flexibility in how a court may 
choose to use the ratio from a precedential case, just as there is flexibility 
in how statutes are applied. 
 The processes of finding the appropriate case or cases (the process of 
equivalence) and of identifying and articulating the binding ratios also in-
volve the process of distinguishing. Distinguishing is the name given to 
the decision of the judge not to employ the ratio of an arguably binding 
precedent. Sometimes, judges depart from an arguably binding precedent 
by establishing significant differences in the facts of the case or the previ-
ous decision with the result that two superficially similar cases turn out to 
be not so similar after all. In this way, the judges are restricting the scope 
of application of the ratio from the previous decision. Using Kornhauser’s 
vocabulary, one would say that the judges are reducing the rule of the 
previous decision to its fact-based result. As stated above, the author sug-
gests that this be termed a teleological reduction. No matter what no-
menclature is used, the effect of distinguishing is to release the case in 
question from applying the rule from the arguably precedential case.  
 This process of distinguishing, by the way, is exactly the same process 
as is used when a judge decides not to employ an arguably applicable stat-
ute. Sometimes, the judge will establish significant differences between 
the facts as stated in the statute and those found by the judge. This is 
commonly done by defining or re-defining the statutory language so that 
the statute, which seemed superficially similar to that case at hand, turns 
out to be not so similar after all. In this way, the judge (teleologically) re-
duces the reach of the statute. 
 
32. Lewis A Kornhauser, “Stare Decisis,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and 
the Law vol 3 (Peter Newmann ed 1998). 
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4. The role of precedents in civil law jurisdictions 
Although civil law jurisdictions do not expressly recognize the doctrine of 
stare decisis, civilian judges in the first instance work in judicial hierarchies 
in which they are expected to follow the rulings of the judges on the ap-
pellate courts. In addition to creating more work for the appellate courts, 
the failure of lower court judges to follow appellate court rulings would 
violate notions of equality, lessen predictability, and undermine the pub-
lic’s trust in the judiciary. Further, many civil law countries have statutes 
on the books that require inferior judges to follow the decisions of judges 
superior to them in the judicial hierarchy.33 In addition, there are statutes 
regulating the binding power of precedents of the various panels on ap-
pellate courts in civilian jurisdictions.34 To promote efficiency, predictabil-
ity, and collegiality, the legislatures in civilian jurisdictions often enact 
statutes requiring all panels of such courts either to follow the previous 
rulings of the other panels, or else call for an en banc decision of all of the 
panels of the court so that they can reach agreement on how the law 
should be interpreted. 
 In fact, such en banc decisions are extremely rare.35 In the vast majority 
of cases, the judges of the other panels accept the considered judgments 
of their colleagues on the other panels. It is also very rare for the panels to 
overrule their own decisions.  
 These assertions can be illustrated by the following statistics that the 
author has collected on the German Federal Constitutional Court. In the 
first 55 years of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s existence 
(1951-2006) in which it published 2,999 full decisions,36 the two senates of 
 
33. E.g., German Federal Constitutional Court Statute (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) 
§ 31 (I). 
34. E.g., German Federal Constitutional Court Statute (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz) 
§ 16. See also chapter 3, section 5 of the Swedish Procedural Code (rättegångsbalken), 
discussed in Gunnar Bergholz & Aleksander Peczenik, “Precedent in Sweden,” In-
terpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study 300 et seq. (N MacCormick & RS Summers 
eds 1997). 
35. Thomas Lundmark, “Stare decisis vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht,” 28 
Rechtstheorie 330 et seq. (1997); Thomas Lundmark, Charting the Divide between Com-
mon and Civil Law 332 et seq. (2012). 
36. This figure was arrived at by adding up all of the judgments in the official reports, 
the Sammlung der Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen (BVerfGE). During the 
same period, the three-judge chambers, which are discussed below, issued 133,831 
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the German Federal Constitutional Court departed from only 15 previous 
decisions in addition to four departures under the section 16 en banc pro-
cedure of the German Federal Constitutional Court Statute. Using the meth-
odology employed above for the United States Supreme Court, which, 
like the German Federal Constitutional Court, has the power of constitu-
tional judicial review, one can conclude that the United States Supreme 
Court is nearly twice as likely as the German Federal Constitutional Court 
to overrule previous cases (an overruling rate of 1.13 per cent compared 
to 0.63 per cent respectively). Furthermore, as reported in a previous sec-
tion of this paper, the author’s research shows that the United States Su-
preme Court engaged in political overrulings at a rate of 0.47 per cent 
compared to a rate of 0.37 per cent for the German Court. These figures 
suggest that the German Federal Constitutional Court shows roughly the 
same respect for precedents as the United States Supreme Court. 
5. Conclusion 
Although respect for previous judicial decisions can be traced back to the 
earliest centuries of the common law, the doctrine of stare decisis as we 
know it today – the search for the law in single judicial decisions – did not 
arise until the 19th century. There are three basic reasons why it did not 
arise earlier: (1) the unclear structure of the judicial hierarchies before 
1875; (2) the unavailability of reliable reports of the judicial decisions; 
and, most importantly, (3) the realization that judicial decision-making is 
a form of law-making, and law-making should be left as much as possible 
to the legislature. 
 The law pronounced in judicial decisions can only be effective as law if 
the populace believes that the judges will not change their decisions arbi-
trarily. Consequently, overrulings should ordinarily be limited to those 
which correct mistakes (corrective overruling) and those which seek to 
update previous decisions in light of changes in society (renovative over-
rulings). “Political” or “legislative” overrulings are those which cannot be 
classified as corrective or renovative. They are due to the appointment of 
new judges to the court. But even these overrulings have a place, especial-
ly when the court is construing constitutional law. 
 
decisions and disposed of 1,789 applications for preliminary relief. See 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/organisation/organisation.html. 
THE METHODOLOGY OF USING PRECEDENTS 
 353
 Stare decisis is not limited to the common law world. Convincing evi-
dence of a similar process can be found in civil law jurisdictions like 
Germany. The overruling practice of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, for example, looks very similar to that of the United States Su-
preme Court. 
 The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the fundamental principle of 
justice: that like cases must be decided alike, that is, equality. The vertical 
aspect of the doctrine serves equality, predictability, and efficiency. The 
horizontal aspect also serves a fourth purpose: judicial respect for separa-
tion of powers. This fourth purpose engenders public trust in the justice 
system and in that way enhances the legitimacy of the entire legal system. 
 
